This paper studies an economy in which the production network is endogenously determined by the firms' extensive margin of production. Because of the presence of fixed costs, a firm might decide not to produce, thereby severing connections with potential suppliers and customers. Every stable equilibrium in this economy can be characterized as the solution to a social planner's problem. But because of the discrete decisions involved in the formation of the network, standard optimization techniques can take an infeasibly long time to find a solution. To overcome this issue, I propose a novel solution method that involves reshaping the planner's problem. Analytic results and numerical simulations show that the method rapidly finds the planner's solution in a class of economies that were considered particularly challenging. To illustrate how this approach works in practice, I show that a basic calibration of the model can capture how the U.S. production network changes over the business cycle. The calibrated model also features cascades of firm shutdowns that resemble those observed in the data. In addition, I find that the endogenous reorganization of the network leads to substantially smaller variations in aggregate output.
Introduction
Production in modern economies involves a complex network of specialized producers, each using inputs from suppliers and providing their own output to downstream production units. In such an environment, the way in which shocks to individual producers aggregate to affect macroeconomic variables depends on the shape of the production network (Acemoglu et al., 2012) . But the network itself is also constantly changing in response to these shocks. In the data, a key driver behind these changes is the firms' entry and exit decisions. For instance, in the U.S. a large fraction of all link destructions occur when one of the two firms forming the relationship stops production. 1 Yet, these types of network formation problems have been neglected by the literature-perhaps because of technical issues that make standard solution techniques unhelpful. This paper proposes a methodology to solve network formation problems driven by the firms' extensive margin of production. The general setting is as follows: there is a finite number n of firms each producing a differentiated good using labor and a set of inputs from other producers. Production requires the payment of a fixed cost so that firms operate or not as a function of economic conditions. When a firm operates, it makes an additional input available to all of its customers, thereby creating new input-output relationships. Together, the operating decisions of the firms therefore determine the structure of the production network.
Every stable equilibrium is efficient in this environment, and I therefore focus on the problem P of a social planner. A bare bones version of this problem involves choosing the operating status θ j ∈ {0, 1} of the n firms to maximize a welfare function V P . This problem is hard to solve for two reasons.
First, the operating decisions of the firms are discrete so that P's feasible set, {0, 1} n , is non-convex.
Second, complementarities between operating decisions of nearby producers arise naturally in this environment-a firm will not produce without a supplier-and their presence breaks the concavity of the objective function. As a result, V P features multiple local maxima and standard numerical algorithms are ineffective. Finding a solution, for instance by comparing the welfare level provided by each of the 2 n potential vectors θ in {0, 1} n , can take an infeasibly long time.
To overcome these difficulties, this paper proposes a novel solution approach that involves reshaping the planner's problem. Consider an alternative optimization problem, denoted by R, that is constructed from P by first relaxing the feasible set {0, 1} n so that it now includes all the points in [0, 1] n . This process introduces new points to optimize over but, importantly, these new points have no economic meaning in our environment. We can therefore modify the objective function over them to help us solve P. To that end, consider an objective function V R for R that coincides with V P over the economically meaningful points, {0, 1} n , while possibly differing elsewhere. The key idea behind the solution approach, is to construct V R so that R is easy to solve and that its solution also solves the planner's problem P. I describe how to construct such a V R , and I establish sufficient conditions under which this approach is guaranteed to find the efficient allocation. But even when those conditions are not met, numerical simulations show that the proposed procedure provides a rapid and robust way of tackling network formation problems that were considered particularly challenging (Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2018) .
To illustrate how the approach can be useful in practice, I provide a basic calibration of the model to the United States economy. I find that the economic forces at work in the environment play an important role in shaping the production network. In particular, the economy features cascades of firm shutdowns that resemble those in the data. In addition, the mechanisms generate correlations between 1 Appendix C.1 explores the importance of the extensive margin of production for link destruction in the U.S. data. the shape of the network and the business cycles that are also consistent with the data. Finally, I find that allowing the production network to reorganize itself in response to idiosyncratic shocks leads to substantially smaller variations in aggregate output. This last exercise highlights the importance of the formation of the network for the aggregation of microeconomic shocks into macroeconomic fluctuations.
Literature. This paper contributes to a recent literature in which production networks are built endogenously by the decisions of economic agents. 2 Oberfield (2018) builds a model in which producers optimally choose one input from a randomly evolving set of suppliers, thereby creating the production network. He finds that star suppliers can emerge endogenously in equilibrium. Lim (2018) studies sourcing decisions in a model with sticky relationships. In independent contemporaneous work Acemoglu and Azar (2018) consider a network of competitive industries in which firms select a production technique that involves different sets of suppliers. They show that the endogenous evolution of the network can generate long-run growth. These papers feature a continuum of firms so that aggregate fluctuations do not arise from individual firm-level shocks. Tintelnot et al. (2018) build a model of endogenous network formation and international trade. In contrast to the current paper, they only consider acyclic networks. Boehm and Oberfield (2018) estimate a model of network formation using Indian micro data to study misallocation in the inputs market. In contrast to this literature, the current paper studies an economy in which the input-output network is built endogenously through the extensive production decisions of the firms-a margin that accounts for a large fraction of link changes in the U.S. data and that allows for cascades of firm shutdowns. This paper also relates to Baqaee (2018) who studies cascades of firm shutdowns but in an economy with an exogenous production network.
One methodological contribution of this paper, that may be of independent interest, is a new solution technique for nonlinear optimization problems with binary variables. Several heuristics have been developed to handle these problems (Li and Sun, 2006) . Closest to the present work are smoothing algorithms that attempt to get rid of the local maxima that emerge in the relaxed problem (Murray and Ng, 2010) . In practice, finding an appropriate smoother is usually done through trial and error and there is no guarantee that the algorithm converges to a global maximum. In contrast, the current work explicitly describes how to reshape the objective function of the planner and proposes a rapid and robust solution method.
Model
The model is static, and there are three types of agents: firms, a final good producer and a representative household. There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of firms, each of which produces a dif-ferentiated good that can be used as intermediate input by the final good producer and the other firms. The final good producer uses a CES production technology with elasticity of substitution σ > 1 and factor intensities {β j } j∈N to convert intermediate inputs {c j } j∈N into aggregate output
. The representative household consumes C and supplies L units of labor inelastically.
To produce, a firm j ∈ N must employ f j L ≥ 0 units of labor as a fixed cost, in which case we say that it is operating. The vector θ ∈ {0, 1} n keeps track of the operating decisions of the firms, such that θ j = 1 if j operates and θ j = 0 otherwise. When it operates, firm j has access to a technology that converts l j units of labor and a vector of intermediate inputs {x ij } i∈N into y j units of good j according to the production function
where Ω ij ≥ 0 denotes the exogenous factor intensity of input i, ε j > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between inputs, 0 < 1 − α j < 1 is the labor intensity, and A > 0 and z j > 0 are aggregate and firm-specific total factor productivities. 3 We see from (1) that a firm j can only use inputs from a supplier i if Ω ij > 0. As such, the matrix Ω describes a network of potential connections between firms. A potential connection (i, j) is activewith goods being traded-if firms i and j both operate, otherwise it is inactive. The production network is therefore jointly determined by Ω and θ, and economic conditions, through their impact on the firms' operating decisions, endogenously determine the shape of the network. Figure 1a provides an example of the potential connections Ω ij > 0 in an economy with six firms.
The set of active connections, in blue in Figure 1b , is determined by the set of operating firms.
While the paper focuses on the operating decisions θ as the key determinants of the shape of the network, the model is general enough to accommodate the formation of individual links. For that purpose, we can think of a link as a pseudo firm whose good is not included in the production of the final good, and that has a single potential supplier and customer.
Planner's problem. Consider the problem P of a social planner that maximizes final good con- 
where y j is given by (1), and a resource constraint for labor,
We say that an allocation is efficient if it solves P.
The paper focuses on the planner's problem, but Appendix A shows that any stable equilibrium in this environment is efficient. As such, by solving P we are also implicitly characterizing all equilibrium allocations.
3 Solving P To solve P, it is useful to first find the best allocation when the production network, or equivalently θ, is fixed. For a fixed θ, P is a convex maximization problem and the usual Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize its solution. Denote by λ j the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint (3) for good j and by w the multiplier on the labor resource constraint (4). The first-order conditions imply that (1 − α j ) y j λ j = wl j so that, as in Oberfield (2018), we can define q j = w/λ j as a measure of firm j's productivity.
The planner's first-order conditions together with the production function yield the following result.
Proposition 1. In the efficient allocation, the productivity vector q satisfies, for all j ∈ N ,
(5)
There is a unique q that solves (5) such that q j > 0 if j operates and has access to at least one input. 4
Proof. All proofs are in Appendix D.
Equation (5) fully characterizes the firms' productivities in this environment. Its recursive structure implies that any change in productivity propagates downstream-from customer to customer-through production chains. In addition, (5) implies that a firm that has access to a greater variety of active suppliers, leading to more terms in the summation in (5), is more productive-a standard consequence of the CES production function. This benefit from input variety has important implications for the shape of the network as we will see in Section 4.
Equation (5) can be solved easily by iterating on the mapping . Once q is known, the following lemma shows that aggregate output C can be computed as the product of aggregate productivity Q and the amount of labor available after fixed costs have been paid.
Lemma 1. In the efficient allocation, aggregate output is
.
We can now take a step back to consider the full problem P in which the network itself is a choice variable. By combining Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, we can write P as the problem of finding a vector θ * that maximizes (6), where q solves (5). This problem is hard to solve for two reasons. 5 First, θ is limited to the corners {0, 1} n of the n-dimensional unit hypercube, a non-convex set. But even if θ could move freely over [0, 1] n , the fixed costs create firm-level increasing returns to scale that break the (quasi) concavity of the objective function. As a result, there are usually multiple local maxima, and the standard Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are not helpful to find the global maximum.
I propose a novel method to solve this problem. The key idea is to find an alternative optimization problem that is easy to solve and whose solution also solves P. This alternative problem, denoted by R, is obtained by relaxing and reshaping P. 6 It is defined below alongside P to highlight their differences.
R differs from P in two important ways-emphasized in bold and blue above. First, the binarity constraint is relaxed and θ can now take values on the inside of the unit hypercube, [0, 1] n . While this relaxation has the advantage of convexifying P's feasible set, it also augments the planner's problem with points that have no real economic meaning. For instance, θ j = 0.5 does not correspond to any physical state in the environment. Since they have no interest on their own, we can change the value of the objective function over these new points-and only over these new points-to help us solve P. This is done in (7), a transformed version of (5), which includes the reshaping constants a j > 0 and b ij . These constants modify the shape of the optimization problem everywhere except over P's original feasible set: {0, 1} n . Indeed, for θ ∈ {0, 1} n , θ a j j = θ j for all j. Similarly for b ij , if θ i = 0 then q i = 0 anyway, and if θ i = 1 then θ b ij i = 1. 7 In both cases, the term in the summation is unchanged. This reshaping procedure therefore preserves the ranking, in terms of utility, of the corners {0, 1} n -the only points with actual economic meaning-while elsewhere changing the shape of the optimization problem.
Crucially, we are free to pick the constants a j and b ij to help us solve the planner's problem. In particular, we can pick these constants to increase the concavity of R with the goal of removing the undesirable local maxima that prevent an easy resolution of the relaxed problem. On the other hand, too much concavity can create a new global maximum somewhere in the middle of [0, 1] n , in which case the solutions of P and R would clearly differ. Specific values for a j and b ij provide the right balance and are needed for the results of this section to hold. From now on, I therefore set
( )
The following propositions establish conditions under which R can be solved easily.
6 To my knowledge, reshaping the planner's problem is the only practical way of solving these network formation problems when n is large. An alternative algorithm that involves computing output for each possible network is discussed below but it is unhelpful for economies with more than twenty firms or so. Casual experimentation with genetic algorithms and branch-and-bound algorithms has found them slow and unreliable for these problems.
7 For 7 to be well-defined as θ → 0 + , I impose bij ≥ −aj (εj − 1) for all i, j. This inequality is satisfied by ( ) below.
Proposition 2. Let ε j = ε and α j = α. If Ω ij = d i e j for some vectors d and e then the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize a solution to P RR .
A similar result holds for a different set of Ω's. DefineΩ = ω (1 n − I n ) where 1 n is the all-one matrix, I n is the identity and ω > 0. The matrixΩ describes a network of potential connections in which firms are connected to each other, but not with themselves, with the same intensity ω. Proposition 4. If a solution θ * to R is such that θ * ∈ {0, 1} n then θ * also solves P.
This result follows directly from the fact that the feasible set of R contains the feasible set of P and that both of their objective functions coincide over {0, 1} n by construction.
Together, Propositions 2 to 4 offer a convenient way to solve P. First, find a solution θ * to R using a standard algorithm for convex problems. If θ * belongs to {0, 1} n then it also solves P. This last condition can be tested in practice, but reshaping P would not be very useful if θ * rarely belonged to {0, 1} n . Fortunately, condition ( ) is such that solutions to R are naturally pushed toward {0, 1} n .
The following proposition is critical for this result.
Proposition 5. The (net) marginal benefit of increasing θ j only depends on θ j through aggregates.
These aggregates are summations over many firms. As the number of firms increases, they become more and more independent of θ j , and so does the marginal benefit. 10 To see why this pushes solutions toward {0, 1} n , consider a gradient ascent algorithm that begins at θ j = 1/2. If, for instance, the marginal benefit is positive, the planner increases θ j . But since the marginal benefit itself is independent of θ j , it remains positive and the planner keeps increasing θ j until it reaches 1. The opposite happens if the marginal benefit is initially negative. As a result, the solution θ * to R is in {0, 1} n and Proposition 4 guarantees that θ * also solves P.
8 To be precise, letβ be a n × 1 vector such thatβi =βj for all i, j. Then there exists a ball B = (Ω, β) : (Ω, β) − Ω ,β < δ for δ > 0 such that the statement holds for (Ω, β) ∈ B. An earlier version of this paper included a variant of Proposition 3 for binary matrices Ω.
9 The assumptions about Ω in Propositions 2 and 3 impose that the firms' input sets are not too different from each other. For instance, Ωij = diej implies that the factor intensity vectors of the firms (the columns of Ω) are proportional to each other. Appendix E provides a fast algorithm to solve R. 10 The proof of Proposition 5 shows that the relevant aggregates are Q and Bj
for all j. As the number of firms increases, the number of positive entries in Ω must also grow otherwise the marginal benefit of increasing θj might still dependent on θj. Fortunately, these cases are identified easily in practice: the numerical solution to R will be outside of {0, 1} n . But even in these more pathological cases, Appendix B.3 shows that the solution approach makes minimal errors in aggregate output.
Example with two firms. To better understand how the solution approach works, consider an economy with two firms. The objective function V (θ) of the relaxed planner's problem without any reshaping is shown in Figure 2a . V is shaped like a saddle with local maxima at (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = (1, 0) and (0, 1), and local minima at (0, 0) and (1, 1). The global maximum is at (1, 0). Because of the non-concavity, standard algorithms can get trapped in a local maximum and cannot reliably solve this problem. Figure 2b shows the objective function V R (θ) of the reshaped problem. Three things are worth noticing. First, V and V R coincide at the corners {0, 1} 2 . As a result, the ranking of these corners, in terms of utility, is the same in both problems. Second, the reshaping stretches the objective function so that V R is concave. The first-order conditions are therefore sufficient. Third, the reshaping did not create another maximum somewhere in the inside of [0, 1] 2 , and the maximum of V R is also the maximum of V . As a result, starting from any θ in [0, 1] 2 , standard algorithms like gradient ascent will converge to the global maximum. This point also solves P by Proposition 4. 
Numerical tests
The theoretical results of the last section provide sufficient conditions under which reshaping the planner's problem solves P, but these conditions are far from being necessary. Here, I show through numerical simulations that the solution approach also works well when these conditions are relaxed.
To do so, I randomly draw a large number of economies and compare, for each of them, the solutions to the reshaped problem R and the original problem P. Since there is a finite number of vectors θ in the feasible set of P, we can try them all to find the correct solution. This brute-force approach is however limited to economies with only a few firms. Since there are 2 n possible vectors θ in {0, 1} n , the large number of possibilities quickly becomes infeasible to handle as n increases.
Appendix B provides the details of the simulations. They involve a broad range of economies that cover all the dimensions of heterogeneity allowed by the model. They also cover matrices Ω with different shapes and various degrees of sparsity. The results are presented in Table 1 . We see that reshaping the planner's problem (first two columns) attributes the correct status θ to more than 99.9% of the firms. It also finds output values that are within 0.001% of their correct value. In contrast, without reshaping (last two columns) about 13% of the firms are assigned the wrong operational status and the average error in output can reach above 0.8%, a large number when studying aggregate fluctuations. 11 
Economic forces shaping the network
We now explore how economic forces shape the production network. Here, the benefit of producing with a broader variety of inputs is key.
Highly-connected firms are more likely to operate. As discussed earlier, (5) implies that having access to an additional supplier increases a firm's productivity q. This gain in productivity is then propagated downstream through the production network. Through this mechanics, the benefit from input variety encourages the planner to operate firms that are well-connected in terms of both direct and indirect neighbors (second neighbors, etc.). Indeed, a firm with many upstream suppliers enjoys a larger q, which the planner values, while a firm with numerous downstream producers increases the productivity of its many (perhaps indirect) customers. As a result, these firms are valuable to the planner, which is then more likely to pay the fixed cost to operate them, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 6. In a large economy, operating a firm (weakly) increases the incentives to operate its (perhaps indirect) suppliers and customers in Ω. 12 11 To further test the robustness of the solution approach, Appendix B provides several additional exercises that include economies 1) with a large number of firms, 2) with individual link formation, and 3) for which the solution to R is not in {0, 1} n . Together with the results of Table 1 , these extensive tests show that the solution approach performs well in a broad class of economic environment.
12 An economy is large if the operating decision of any individual firm has no impact on the Lagrange multiplier w associated with the labor resource constraint (4). An indirect customer (supplier ) in Ω is a firm that can be reached by moving downstream (upstream) in the network described by Ω.
Cascades of firm shutdowns can arise. One immediate consequence of this result is that the efficient allocation exhibits complementarities between the operating decisions of nearby firms. These complementarities, in turn, can generate cascades of firm shutdowns. Consider for instance a firm j that stops production after suffering from a severe z shock. In response, its first neighbors, having lost a useful supplier or a valuable customer, are also likely to shut down. But then j's second neighbors are also losing a neighbor and are at a greater risk of shutting down themselves. Since the same logic applies to further neighbors of j, the initial z shock can trigger a wave of shutdowns that spreads through the economy.
Clustering of economic activity. Since having many neighbors is valuable from an efficiency perspective, the planner tends to organize production into tightly connected clusters of operating firms. Figure 3a presents an example of this process by showing the efficient allocation in an economy under two typical random productivity vectors z. We see that, to maximize the benefit from input variety, the planner clusters economic activity in either the top or the bottom group of firms. In addition, the active cluster tends to include the firm with the highest z. By creating an ecosystem around an important producer, the planner maximizes its positive impact on the economy. Proposition 7 shows that the planner prefers to operate groups of firms that are highly connected.
Proposition 7. The incentives of the planner to operate a group of firms (weakly) increase with additional potential connections between them.
Small shocks can lead to large reorganizations. In the efficient allocation, a small change in the environment can trigger a large reorganization of the network. When designing the network, the planner compares the 2 n possibilities and selects the one providing the highest utility. As, say, a firm's TFP z declines there is a point at which the planner shuts the firm down. But because of the complementarities in operating decisions, it might be better to shut down the whole cluster around the firm and to move production elsewhere. Figure 3b provides an example. Both economies are identical except for the productivity z of the red firm which is slightly larger in the economy on the left. While the drop in z from left to right is negligible, it triggers a large reorganization of the network. Aggregate output, however, is barely affected. Indeed, the planner reorganizes the network precisely to limit the negative impact of the shock on output. 13
Quantitative example
To illustrate how the solution approach can be used in practice, this section provides a basic calibration of the model and shows that it captures salient features of the data, such as cascades of firm shutdowns and changes in the shape of the production network over the business cycle.
The calibration uses data about the U.S. firm-level production network from the Factset Revere Supply Chain Relationships Data. These data cover the period from 2003 to 2016, and include almost 13,000 firms and more than 40,000 relationships in a typical year. The details of the calibration are in Appendix C but the main ingredients are as follows. The number of firms is set to n = 1000 as a good trade-off between realism and computation time. Firms share the same parameters but they differ in their productivity z, which follows an AR(1) process. Since the model itself is static, the persistence of that process is the only inter-temporal linkage in the economy. All parameters are taken directly from the literature with the exception of the matrix Ω, which is drawn randomly to match properties of the in-degree (number of customers) distribution in the data.
Cascades of firm shutdowns
Cascades of firm shutdowns arise in this economy because of the complementarities between operating decision of nearby firms. To evaluate the importance of these cascades, I regress the fraction of each firm's neighbors that shut down in a given period on whether the firm itself shuts down. 14 I run separate regressions for upstream and downstream neighbors at various distances from the original firm. The estimated coefficients capture the increase in shutdown probability associated with an exiting neighbor. 15 13 This is a standard result from the Theorem of the Maximum. Note that while aggregate output barely changes, firm-level distributions can change substantially. The discontinuous behavior of the model would be mitigated if the fixed costs were paid when changing the status of a firm instead.
14 In the data, I consider that a firm shuts down during the last year that it is in the sample. 15 To be precise, denote by DX jdt the fraction of firm j's downstream neighbors located at a distance d that exit between t and t + 1. I regress DX jdt = a d Exitjt + Controlsjt + ε jdt , where Exitjt is 1 if j exits between t and t + 1 and 0 Figure 4 shows the estimated coefficients in the Factset data (green dashed lines). We see that the shutdown of a firm is associated with about a 10% increase in the probability that one of its direct neighbors also exits. This number falls to about 2% for the second neighbors and keeps declining afterwards. The model (solid blue lines) is roughly able to match these patterns, suggesting that it broadly captures the joint operating decisions of nearby firms. Table 2 shows that in the data firms that are above the 95th percentile of the degree distribution are associated with cascades that are about three times larger than those associated with the average firm. High-degree firms are, however, less likely to actually shut down in response to shocks, as the third column of Table 2 shows. In the data, an average firm has a 11.8% chance of exiting in a given year, while this number drops to 2.0% for high-degree firms. The model, despite its simplicity, does well in terms of the size of the cascades and is also able to roughly replicate the exit probabilities. In the model, high-degree firms are particularly valuable to the planner, which keeps them in operation after most negative shocks. When they do shut down, however, the planner reorganizes the whole cluster of producers that was built around them, which explains the large cascades they trigger.
otherwise. The controls include the in-and out-degree of j to mitigate selection issues. The estimated coefficients {a d } are plotted in the left panel of Figure 4 while the right panel shows the equivalent regression for upstream neighbors. 16 One possible worry is that Figure 4 captures common shocks across firms instead of propagation through the network. For instance, since trading partners are likely to be geographically close to each other, a local shock like an earthquake could directly affect both of them at the same time. To alleviate this concern, I run the same regressions on supplier/customer pairs located in different zip codes. Reassuringly, the outcome of these regressions are close to those of Figure 4 . In careful empirical work, Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) and Carvalho et al. (2016) also show clear propagation of shocks through supply chains in the data. Notes: "High degree firms" are above the 95 th percentile of the degree distribution. "Size of cascades" corresponds to the sum of exiting firms up to the second neighbors downstream and upstream, computed by multiplying the regression coefficients in Figure 4 by the number of neighbors at a given distance.
Aggregate fluctuations
There are no aggregate shocks in the model but, since the number of firms is finite, aggregate fluctuations arise from the idiosyncratic shocks to z. In this section, we consider how these microeconomic shocks give rise to correlations between the shape of the network and aggregate output. We also investigate how the endogenous reorganization of the network affects the aggregation of these shocks into macroeconomic fluctuations. 17, 18 Comovements. I focus on three key moments to describe how the shape of the network changes over the business cycle. The first two moments are the in-degree (number of suppliers) and out-degree (number of customers) distributions. In the model and in the data, these distributions are close to power laws so that their exponent parameters provide a good description of the full distributions. As is now well-known, these exponents have an important influence for the aggregate impact of idiosyncratic shocks (Acemoglu et al., 2012) . 19 The third moment is the global clustering coefficient which measures how tightly connected firms are with one another-a key moment given the importance of clustering for productivity. 20 Table 3 shows that in the data the exponent parameters of the degree distributions are negatively correlated with output, which indicates thicker tails and an abundance of well-connected firms during expansions. The economy also features more clustering during booms. The model is able to roughly match these patterns. When well-positioned firms receive good z shocks, the planner builds dense 17 In a richer model, firms could have to pay a cost to change their operating status. These costs would limit the reaction of the network in response to temporary z shocks. They would also make the model dynamic, adding significant technical difficulties given the size of the state space in this economy.
18 Adding aggregate productivity shocks to the model does not change the main conclusions of this section. Proposition 9 in Appendix C.5 shows that the network itself is invariant to these shocks and that they simply add an exogenous term to output volatility. In addition, Online Appendix C.5 provides a version of the calibrated economy with a much larger number of firms and aggregate shocks. The results are similar to those in the main text. 19 The out-degree distribution in the calibrated economy is closely related to the centrality distribution, which is the focus of Acemoglu et al. (2012) . Conducting the exercises of this section with the centrality distribution instead yields similar results. 20 The global clustering coefficient equals three times the number of triangles (three fully connected nodes) divided by the number of triplets (three connected nodes). In power law graphs, the global clustering coefficient declines naturally with n. Following Ostroumova Prokhorenkova and Samosvat (2014), I therefore normalize the clustering coefficients by multiplying them by the square root of the number of nodes. This normalization allows for a better comparison of networks of different sizes. ecosystems of suppliers and customers around them. These clusters are highly productive which generates the correlations between output, clustering and the degree distributions. Inversely, in recessions it might be too costly to organize these productive clusters-perhaps because a few critical firms face low z's. As a result, economic activity is more dispersed and output is lower. 21 Level and volatility of output. We now consider the impact of the endogenous formation of the network on aggregate output. To do so, it is useful to compare the efficient allocation, in which the network is constantly reorganized in response to shocks, to an alternative economy in which the network is designed efficiently in the first period but then kept completely fixed. The differences between these two economies capture the role played by the endogenous network mechanisms. Doing this exercise, I find that aggregate output is 11% lower and 20% more volatile when the network is kept fixed. 22,23 These numbers highlight the importance of the mechanism for the aggregation of microeconomic shocks into macroeconomic fluctuations. They also suggest that policies or frictions that would impede the reorganization of the network might lead not only to a loss in output but also to an increase in its volatility. 24
Conclusion
U.S. data suggest that the firms' extensive margin of operation plays an important role in shaping the production network. This paper proposes a novel approach to solve these network formation problems. The methodology involves reshaping the problem of the social planner such that it can be solved 21 Appendix C.5 shows that these correlations are also in the Compustat data, an alternative dataset which covers fewer firm-level relationships but over a longer time period.
22 There exist parametrizations under which the flexible network economy is more volatile than its fixed network counterpart. For reasonable changes in the parameters of the calibration, however, the flexible network economy remains the least volatile. Note also that the 20% difference in volatility is conservative in the sense that other parametrizations, in the range of values found in the literature, lead to much bigger differences. 23 When, in addition to the network itself, all the inputs of the firms are kept fixed, output volatility increases by 40% compared to the flexible network benchmark. On its own, the endogenous formation of the network is therefore able to explain half of the reduction in volatility generated by all the adjustment margins together.
24 Additional exercises can be found in the Appendix. Appendix C.4 shows that the endogenous formation of the network leads to degree distributions with thicker tails and to more clustering. Online Appendix G discuss the impact of Ω on the shape of the network. easily using standard techniques. Analytical results and numerical simulations find that this approach is successful in a broad family of economies. A basic calibration shows that the model generates cascades of firm shutdowns and correlations between aggregate output and the shape of the network that are consistent with the data. It also suggests that considering the impact of microeconomic shocks on the shape of the production network might be of first-order importance for aggregate volatility. The solution approach introduced in this paper might be of independent interest and could be useful to tackle other non-convex optimization problems with discrete choices.
Appendix A Equilibrium
This section shows that the efficient allocation chosen can also be sustained as an equilibrium. The key equilibrium concept is that of stability: an allocation is a stable equilibrium if no coalition of firms wishes to deviate. This equilibrium definition has proven to be particularly convenient in network economies (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Hatfield et al., 2013) . The approach followed here is most closely related to .
Before formally defining an equilibrium, we describe the market structure in this economy. A contract between two firms i and j is a pair {x ij , T ij } where x ij is a quantity shipped from i to j, and T ij is a payment from j to i. An arrangement is a contract between all possible pairs of firms
Under a given arrangement, a firm j decides on a price p j to charge the household, an amount c j to sell to the household, how much labor l j to employ and whether to produce or not (θ j ). It picks these quantities to maximize its profits
subject to a technology constraint
and the household demand for its good
is the usual price index and where w is the wage. An allocation is feasible if the technology constraints (9) and the labor resource constraint j l j + j θ j f j L ≤ L are satisfied.
A coalition is a set of firms J. A deviation for a given coalition J consists of (i) dropping any contracts that involve at least one firm in J and (ii) altering the terms of any contract involving a buyer and a supplier that are both members of the coalition. A dominating deviation for a given coalition is a deviation that delivers at least the same amount of profits to all members of the coalition and strictly greater profits to at least one member.
We can now define an equilibrium in this environment.
Definition 1. A stable equilibrium is an arrangement {x ij , T ij } i,j∈N 2 , firms' choices {p j , c j , l j , θ j } j∈N and a wage w such that (i) given the wage, total profits, and prices, the consumption choices {c j } j∈N maximize the utility of the representative household; (ii) for each j ∈ N , {p j , c j , l j , θ j } maximizes the profits of j given the arrangement, the wage, the household demand and the technology constraint; (iii) labor and final goods market clear; (iv) there are no dominating deviations available to any coalition;
and (v) the equilibrium allocation is feasible.
The following proposition shows how stable equilibria and the efficient allocation are related.
Proposition 8. Every stable equilibrium is efficient.
This proposition shows that the efficient network can be thought of as arising from the individual decisions of private agents, without the need for taxes or subsidies. 
B Numerical tests

B.2 Economies with a large number of firms
The simulations of Section 3.1 involve a small number of firms but the solution approach also works well when the economy features a large number of firms. While the true solution to the planner's problem is unknown in these cases, we can verify whether there exist welfare-improving deviations from the solution to the reshaped problem. In particular, I verify whether changing the status θ of each firm improves welfare. I keep repeating this procedure as long as there are deviations to be found, and then compare this deviation-free solution to the original one given by the reshaping approach.
The precise algorithm is described in Appendix E.3.
Since this procedure is computationally costly, I only consider large economies that follow the calibration of Section 5. The results are presented in Table 4 . Again, the reshaping approach performs very well. After all the possible deviations are accounted for, more than 99.9% of the firms have kept the same θ and aggregate output has changed by a negligible amount. 26 In contrast, without reshaping more than 30% of firms are assigned the wrong θ, and the error in aggregate output amounts to about 0.6%. While this test does not guarantee that the solution approach finds the correct efficient allocation, it provides a good indication that there are no obvious mistakes in its solution. The results presented in Table 1 exclude economies in which the first-order conditions of R are satisfied at a vector θ such that 0 < θ j < 1 for at least one firm j, which happens in less than a tenth of the simulations. This section shows that even when these cases are not excluded from the sample reshaping the problem of the planner proves to be a valuable tool. To see this, Table 5 shows the same tests as Table 1 but without excluding any economies. The table also breaks down the results by sparsity of the matrix Ω. "Less connected Ω's" refers to matrices Ω with 3, 4 or 5 potential incoming connections on average while "More connected Ω's" refers to matrices Ω with 6, 7 or 8 potential connections on average. 27 We learn a few things from this table. First, even when no simulations are 26 When the reshaping approach fails it is in general because it gets the wrong operating status for a firm that is fairly isolated from the rest of the network. Since, these firms are in general small, they only have little influence on aggregate production, which explains why the error in output is very small in Table 4 . 27 The corresponding average number of active connections is 2.9 for less connected Ω's and 5.2 for more connected Ω's. excluded, the reshaping algorithm performs well. On average, the error in aggregate output C is only 0.009%. In contrast, without reshaping the error is on average 0.77%-86 times more. Second, the error in C is smaller when the matrix Ω has fewer zeros in it. This is in line with the analytical results of Section 3 (see footnote 10). Third, as the number of firms n increases the errors in C stay roughly constant. In contrast, without reshaping the errors grow. This suggests that reshaping the planner's problem becomes increasingly useful as the the economy becomes larger. 28 Table 1 except that all simulations are kept in the sample. "Less connected Ω" refers to Ω's in which firms have, on average, 3, 4 or 5 potential incoming connections. "More connected Ω" refers to Ω's in which firms have, on average, 6, 7 or 8 potential incoming connections.
x < 0.001% indicates that x > 0 but that proper rounding would yield 0. Table 6 shows the percentage of correct θ from the same simulations. Again the results show that the solution approach works best on more connected matrices Ω, but it always outperforms the no-reshaping numbers by large margins.
A similar exercise can also be done for economies with a large number of firms. This exercise is analogous to that of Table 4 and is presented in Table 7 . We see that even when the first-order conditions of R yield a solution θ such that 0 < θ j < 1 for at least one j the errors in aggregate output are negligible. This last test suggests that the solution approach works particularly well in realistic economics with a large number of firms. Indeed, in general only a small number of firms are away from the {0, 1} bounds. These firms are usually somewhat isolated in the network and their impact on aggregate outcome is limited.
B.4 Formation of the network link by link
While the paper focuses on the role of the firms' extensive margin of operation for the formation of the network, the model is general enough to accommodate networks that are formed link by link.
In this context, it is useful to think of a link as a pseudo firm that 1) has a single potential supplier 28 Finally, note that we can see whether θ ∈ {0, 1} n or not when solving the problem. If extreme precision is needed, we can be extra careful when θ / ∈ {0, 1} n and use additional tests (for instance we can look for beneficial deviations) to check the robustness of the solution. and a single potential customer, such that i (Ω ij > 0) = i (Ω ji > 0) = 1, and 2) produces a good that is not included in the production of the final good, such that β j = 0. In this context, the cost f j of this "link firm" is the fixed cost of operating the link, its productivity z j affects the variable cost of shipping goods through that link and α j controls how labor intensive the shipping technology is.
This appendix provides the results of two exercises that show that reshaping the planner's problem is also useful in finding the correct production network when we allow for the formation of individual links. In both exercises, the economy contains m real firms that are always active (f j = 0). 29 Any two of these real firms are connected to each other by a link with some probability p > 0 that varies across exercises (i.e. for any ordered pair of real firms i, j: with probability p there exists a "link firm" k such that Ω ik > 0 and Ω kj > 0). There are no other connections in Ω.
Individual link formation in small networks
When the number m of real firms is small, we can use the same approach as in Section 3.1 and find the true solution to the planner's problem by comparing the welfare provided by each possible network θ (see algorithm in Appendix E.2). There are at most m (m − 1) links in an economy, in which case 2 m(m−1) networks have to be compared. Since this quantity grows rapidly with m, Table   8 shows the results of these tests when there are only m ∈ {3, 4, 5} real firms. As before, the outcome of this exhaustive search is compared to the allocation found by reshaping the planner's problem.
We see from Table 8 that the reshaping algorithm works well. Over all the simulations, more than 99.7% of the links are assigned the proper operating status θ and the errors in aggregate output are small. Without reshaping, large fractions of the links are assigned the wrong operating status and the errors in aggregate output can be sizable. 
Individual link formation in large networks
For economies with a large number of firms, the true solution to the planner's problem is unknown but we can check whether there exist welfare-improving deviations from the allocation found using the reshaped problem. The procedure is the same as in the Section B.2 above. The parameters of the tests are the same as in Table 8 but the economies feature m ∈ {10, 25, 40} real firms and, at most, n ∈ {100, 625, 1600} total firms (real plus links). The results are presented in Table 9 . We see that reshaping the planner's problem yields solutions with few welfare-improving deviations so that the vast majority of links are assigned the correct status and the errors in aggregate output are negligible.
In contrast, a large fraction of the links are assigned the wrong status when the problem of the planner is not reshaped and the errors in aggregate output are significant.
One potential concern of using the reshaping method in this context is that the first-order conditions often converge on a vector θ such that θ j / ∈ {0, 1} for at least one firm. 30 Since, for the economies considered here, the matrix Ω is extremely sparse, the forces pushing the first-order conditions to hit the bounds are weakened (see footnote 10). In practice, however, this issue has limited implications.
In most cases, only a small fraction of the links end up away from the {0, 1} bounds, and their impact on aggregate output is minimal. Table 10 shows the outcome of the same simulations but without Notes: The parameters of these tests, except for m, are the same as in Table 8 . An economy is kept in the sample only if the first-order conditions converge to a point in {0, 1} n . x < 0.001% indicates that x > 0 but that proper rounding would yield 0, and similarly for x > 99.9%.
excluding any simulations. We see that the results are essentially unchanged and that the solution approach also performs well in these situations. Notes: The parameters of these tests are the same as in Table 8 . No economies are excluded from the sample.
x < 0.001% indicates that x > 0 but that proper rounding would yield 0, and similarly for x > 99.9%.
C Quantitative exercises
This appendix provides additional information about the calibrated model of Section 5 as well as robustness exercises.
C.1 Data
The main firm-level input-output dataset is the Factset Revere Supply Chain Relationships Data, which covers the period from 2003 to 2016. These data are gathered by analysts from a variety of sources such as 10-K and 10-Q fillings, annual reports, investor presentations, websites, press releases, etc. I restrict the sample to links in which at least one partner is located in the U.S. and I use the SDC Platinum dataset to exclude firms that are the target of a merger or an acquisition. In an average
year, the sample includes almost 13,000 firms and more than 40,000 relationships.
We can use these data to evaluate the importance of the firms' extensive operating margin for the shape of the production network. In an average year, more than 40% of all link destructions occur at the same time as either the supplier or the customer (or both) stops producing. 31 This number suggests that the firms' decisions to operate play a first-order role in shaping input-output relationships, and it highlights the importance of modeling these decisions to properly understand the formation of the production network.
To verify the robustness of some empirical patterns, I also use Compustat data in Appendix C.5.
These data cover fewer firms-about 1,300 firms and 1,500 relationships in an average year-but over a longer time period. They are available since 1976. The longer time series can be used to better estimate business cycles correlations. Compustat gathers data about firms' major customers, defined as buyers of more than 10% of their overall sales, from annual financial statements. Because of this truncation, we rarely see a firm supplying to more than 10 clients in the data. As a result, the tail of the out-degree distribution in Compustat is likely to be artificially thinner. Factset also relies on these data but supplements them using a variety of other sources. This issue is therefore likely to be I construct the matrix Ω by assuming that the number of potential incoming and outgoing connections, for any given firm, is drawn from a bivariate power law of the first kind. This family of and 2016). Similarly, A firm is considered as shutting down during the last year that it is in the sample (again, excluding the last year in the sample). The analogous exercise for link creations finds a similar number. 32 I thank the authors for sharing their data. 33 See Appendix C.5 for simulations with n = 20, 000 firms and aggregate shocks. The results are similar.
distributions is entirely described by a unique shape parameter ξ. I set ξ = 1.79 so that the distribution of active incoming connections generated by the model is close to its empirical counterpart. 34
These two distributions are well approximated by power laws, with the empirical distribution close to following Zipf's law. I therefore target a power law exponent of 1 for the distribution generated by the model. This indirect inference approach ensures that the calibrated economy is consistent with a key feature of the empirical production network. 35 So that the results do not hinge on one particular
matrix Ω, I draw 20 different Ω's with these properties and, for each of them, simulate the economy for 100 periods. 36 The results are averages over these 20 matrices. Table 11 shows how the calibrated production network compares to the U.S. data. The first two rows show the power law exponents for the in-degree and out-degree distributions, and the third row shows the global clustering coefficients. 37 The model fits the Factset data relatively well but there are some discrepancies with the Compustat datasets. These discrepancies are particularly important when looking at the out-degree distribution which is not surprising given the 10% truncation described above. Notes: Power law exponents are estimated following Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) . Global clustering coefficients are multiplied by the square roots of the number of nodes. See footnote 20 for details. Figure 5 shows the degree distributions in the model and in the Factset data for 2016, the most recent year in the sample. To properly highlight the shape of these distributions, the figure uses a log-log scale and plots the complementary cumulative distributions (CCDF) on the vertical axis.
C.3 Calibrated economy
The roughly linear shapes confirm that they are close to power laws. The model fits the in-degree distribution well but the fit of the out-degree distribution is less precise. Again, the data limitations discussed above are the likely culprit for the departure from the power law observed in the right tail 34 Online Appendix G shows how the network reacts to changes in ξ. 35 The out-degree distribution is not targeted since the 10% reporting threshold from accounting rules distorts this distribution the most, as explained earlier. All power law exponents are estimated following Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) . Appendix E.5 provides the algorithm used to construct Ω. 36 I discard and redraw simulations for which iterating on the first-order conditions does not converge to a point θ in {0, 1} n . This rarely happens and, overall, the rejected networks do not look different than the retained ones. Keeping all the simulations in the sample yields very similar results.
37 See footnote 20 in the main text for a definition of this coefficient. 
C.4 Comparison with a neutral network
To highlight which network features are desirable for efficiency, it is useful to compare the efficient network to a neutral benchmark built by operating each firm with some probability p > 0, where p is set so that both networks have the same number of active firms. All other quantities are chosen optimally. Since it is completely random, any discrepancies between this neutral benchmark and the efficient networks are design decisions taken by the planner to improve efficiency. Table 12 shows how both networks differ. The power law exponents are smaller in the efficient network, indicating thicker tails than in the neutral network. The efficient network therefore features a larger fraction of highly connected suppliers and customers. The clustering coefficient is also larger in the efficient network. 39 These moments highlight the planner's preferred way of organizing production:
it creates tightly connected clusters of economic activity centered around firms with many connections.
By building the network in this way, the planner takes full advantage of gains from input variety present in the environment. 38 The model generates similar in-and out-degree distributions. In countries with better firm-level network data such as Japan, the in-and out-degree distributions also look similar (Bernard et al., 2015) . 39 This exercise shows that a large amount of clustering among firms comes from the endogenous mechanisms of the model. To further disentangle how much clustering comes from the exogenous matrix Ω versus the endogenous forces, I also compute the local clustering coefficient of each firm in the endogenous production network and compare it to its local clustering coefficient in the exogenous network Ω. That clustering coefficient is 40% larger in the endogenous production network, such that the forces at work in the economy generate substantial clustering on their own. Notes: Power law exponents are estimated following Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) . Global clustering coefficients are multiplied by the square roots of the number of nodes (see footnote 20).
C.5 Aggregate Fluctuations
This section contains additional results related to the aggregate fluctuations exercises of Section
5.2.
Invariance of the network to aggregate shocks. The following lemma establishes conditions under which changes in aggregate productivity have no effect on the network.
Proposition 9. If α j = α for all j ∈ N , then the efficient network is invariant with respect to A.
The proof of the proposition essentially shows that we can write the planner's problem as
We see that A only enters the problem by multiplying aggregate output. As a result, it has no impact on the optimal choice of θ and, therefore, on the production network itself. We can also use (11) to compute the impact of aggregate shocks on output volatility. If the variance of log output was x without fluctuations in A, then the overall variance of log output would simply be x + (1 − α) −2 y if we added shocks (independent of z) with a variance of y to log (A).
Proposition 9 shows that we can first abstract from variations in aggregate productivity to focus on firm-level shocks when studying the joint movements in aggregate output and the shape of the network. Aggregate shocks can be easily added afterwards.
Aggregate fluctuations in the Compustat data. While the Factset data covers a large number of input-output relationships in a typical year, its timespan is relatively short. To make sure that the business cycle moments documented in the main text also hold over longer periods, Table 13 extends Table 3 with the network data from the Compustat datasets put together by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) (CF) and (AHRS), as described in Section C.1. We see that the movements between the production network and aggregate output go in the same direction as in the Factset data although the magnitudes differ. 
D Proofs
This section contains the proofs.
D.1 Equilibrium
The following lemma is useful to show that every stable equilibrium is efficient. where g is a strictly increasing function and where λ is such that j y j = 0 at any solution. Suppose that for any solution to Problem A the constraint binds, then Problems A and B have the same solutions.
Proof. Take a point x A , y A that solves Problem A. Then, since the constraint binds j y A j = 0. Suppose x A , y A does not solve Problem B. Then there is another point (x,ỹ) such that jỹ j = 0 (by the definition of λ) and such that g (f (x,ỹ)) − λ jỹ j > g f x A , y A − λ j y A j . Since g is strictly increasing this implies that f (x,ỹ) > f x A , y A but, since (x,ỹ) is in the feasible set of Problem A, this implies that x A , y A was not a solution to Problem A, which is a contradiction.
Conversely, take a point x B , y B that solves Problem B. Then by the definition of λ it must be that j y B j = 0. Suppose x B , y B does not solve Problem A. Then there is another point (x,ỹ) such that jỹ j = 0 (since the constraint in Problem A binds at the optimum) and such that f (x,ỹ) > f x B , y B . Since g is strictly increasing this implies that g (f (x,ỹ)) − λ jỹ j > g f x B , y B − λ j y B j so that x B , y B is not a solution to Problem B, which is a contradiction.
Proof. The proof proceeds by establishing restrictions that any stable equilibrium must satisfy. It then shows that any allocation that satisfies these restrictions must be efficient.
Consider a coalition made of all the firms in the economy. For the equilibrium to be stable there cannot be an alternative arrangement that would yield larger aggregate profits. Otherwise, transfers could be designed to make one firm better off while keeping the other firms at the same profit level. The arrangement {x ij , T ij } i,j must therefore maximize j∈N π j . Now, since a change in the arrangement leads to reoptimization by the firms, an equilibrium arrangement needs to maximize the coalition's profits subject to {p j , c j , l j , θ j } j being determined by the individual firms. Any equilibrium allocation therefore solves (9) and (10) .
It is, however, equivalent to let the coalition itself directly optimize over {p j , c j , l j , θ j } j . To see this, notice that, conditional on the arrangement, the inner maximization problems in (12) are all independent from each other. In other words, the decisions of a firm i have no effect on the profit of a firm j as long as the contracts specified by the arrangement are fulfilled. As a result, we can write (12) as max {x ij } ij ,{c j ,l j ,θ j } j j∈N π j subject to the constraints (9) and (10) for all firms.
By including the household's demand curves directly in the objective function, and by using the definition of π j , the absence of dominating deviations therefore implies that the allocation must solve
subject to (9) for all j ∈ N and where C and P are taken as given. Now, by Lemma 2 this problem is equivalent to an alternative problem in which the coalition maximizes j∈N β 1 σ j c σ−1 σ j σ σ−1 subject to j l j + θ j f j L ≤ L in addition to the other constraints. 40 This reformulated problem is identical to the problem P of the social planner such that any stable equilibrium must be efficient.
D.2 Results about q
The proof of the uniqueness of q relies on the following definitions from .
Definition. A function g : R n → R n is radially quasiconcave ("R-concave") if g (x) = 0 and x > 0 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 implies g (λx) ≥ 0. If (in addition) 0 < λ < 1 implies g (λx) > 0, then g is strictly R-concave.
Definition. A function g = (g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g n ) : R n → R n is quasi-increasing if y i = x i and y j ≥ x j for all j implies g i (y) ≥ g i (x) .
The following Lemma is used as an intermediate step to prove the uniqueness of the vector q. Lemma 3. Denote byÑ any subset of N withñ firms and such that i∈Ñ Ω ij > 0 for all j ∈Ñ .
The function g : Rñ → Rñ defined, for all j ∈Ñ , as
Proof. Suppose that there exists a p * > 0 such that g (p * ) = 0. Then, for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
where the first inequality is strict for 0 < λ < 1 since 0 < α j < 1 and i∈Ñ Ω ij > 0 by assumption. Proposition 1. In the efficient allocation, the productivity vector q satisfies, for all j ∈ N ,
There is a unique q that solves (5) such that q j > 0 if j operates and has access to at least one input.
Proof. The first-order conditions of P with respect to l j and x ij are
Combining these conditions with the production function yields
Plugging (13) and (15) back in the production function yields (5).
I follow to prove the uniqueness of q. Consider the change of variable p j = q ε j j , and letÑ be the set of firms that operate and that have access to at least one input (see footnote 4).
Denote the number of such firms byñ. Clearly, p j = 0 for j / ∈Ñ . We can rewrite equation (5) as the following mapping from Rñ to Rñ:
for all j ∈Ñ . Let f j (p) be the right-hand side of (16) and define g :
Then, by Lemma 3, g is strictly R-concave. Note also that g is quasi-increasing. There is therefore a unique positive q * that satisfies (5). It is such that q * j = p * j 1 ε j if j operates and has access to at least one input, and q * j = 0 otherwise. Note that the proof is essentially unchanged if we use the reshaped equation (7) instead of (5).
D.3 Taking θ as fixed
Proof. The first-order condition of P with respect to c j is
Raising both sides to the power σ−1 σ and summing across j's yields w = Q. Using the first-order conditions (13), (15) and (17) into the resource constraints (3), we find
for all j ∈ N . Summing across j's and simplifying yields (6). Note that once q is known we can find l by inverting (18). We can then find y and x using the first-order conditions (13) and (15).
where q j is implicitly defined by (7). Similarly, let V P : {0, 1} n → R be the objective function of P.
Preliminary result
The proof of Proposition 3 relies on the following lemma.
A is the all-one n × n matrix and B is an n × n matrix.
If B is negative definite on the subspace S : n i=1 x i = 0 then F is positive definite for f > 0 small enough.
Proof. The negative definiteness of B on S implies that x Bx ≤ −d x 2 for x ∈ S and some d > 0.
We can write any vector z as z = x + y where x ∈ S and y ⊥ S. Then,
for f small enough. For f small enough, this last expression is strictly convex in ( x , y ) with a minimum of 0 at (0, 0) or, equivalently, at z = 0. Since z (A − f B) z > 0 for any z = 0, it follows that F is positive definite.
Proofs of concavity
Proposition 2. Let ε j = ε and α j = α. If Ω ij = d i e j for some vectors d and e then the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize a solution to R.
Proof. Raise both sides of (7) to the power ε − 1, multiply by d j θ b j and sum across j's to find
so that, once combined with (7), we find
Computing the log of Q, we get 1) (and in particular if ( ) holds) the exponents on θ are all between 0 and 1 so that the summations in log (Q) are concave functions of θ. The log of a concave function is concave so log (Q) is also concave. Moving towards the full objective function, the term 1 − j∈N θ j f j is concave and so is log V R . Since, in addition, the constraint set θ ∈ [0, 1] n is convex and the Slater's qualification condition is obviously satisfied, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize an optimal solution to the maximization of log (V R (θ)) on the set θ ∈ [0, 1] n . Since log is an increasing transformation, a solution to this problem also solves R. Proof. To simplify the notation, define p j = q σ−1 j and let
R can then be written as
Denote the objective function by Λ. Its Hessian matrix has typical element
and define A, B and C as the matrices with typical elements A kl , B kl and C kl .
We will show that in the limit as Ω →Ω and β j →β for all j the Hessian is positive definite when the largest fixed cost max j f j is small enough. To do so, we will rely on Lemma 4 above. For that Proof of the equivalence of the solutions Proposition 4. If a solution θ * to R is such that θ * ∈ {0, 1} n then θ * also solves P.
Proof. By construction, the objective function V RR of R and the objective function V SP of P coincide over {0, 1} n . Therefore V R (θ * ) = V P (θ * ). Since the feasible set of R, [0, 1] n , contains the feasible set of P, {0, 1} n , it must be that V P (θ * ) ≥ V P (θ) for θ ∈ {0, 1} n , otherwise θ * would not be a solution to R. θ * therefore solves P.
This problem is equivalent to R since the inequality constraints always bind at the optimum. The first-order conditions with respect to θ k and q k are
where ζ j is the Lagrange multiplier on the j-th inequality constraints, andμ j and µ j are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraint θ j ≤ 1 and θ j ≥ 0. 43 Combining these first-order condition yields
For the result to hold, we need ∂Q 
The partial derivatives of qj are to be understood for the binding inequality constraint, i.e. where we see that θ k drops out of the equation if a k = 1 σ−1 . Similarly, we can write
and, by taking into account that q k depends directly on θ k , we see that θ k drops out of the equation if we also impose b kj = 1 − ε j −1 σ−1 . The first-order condition therefore only depends on θ k through the aggregates B k and Q. D.5 Forces shaping the network Proposition 6. In a large economy, operating a firm (weakly) increases the incentives to operate its (perhaps indirect) suppliers and customers in Ω.
Proof. Let j be a newly operating firm. In a large economy, operating j does not affect the Lagrange multiplier on the labor resource constraint w. Consider a firm k downstream from j in Ω. From the recursivity of (5), q k weakly increases as a result of operating j (there is a strict increase if k is a direct neighbor). As a result, the benefit to the planner of operating k also weakly increases. On the other hand, the cost of operating k is still wf k L so that the net benefit of operating k weakly increases. Now consider a firm i that is upstream from j in Ω. From the recursivity of (5) and since j now operates, operating i would weakly increase q j (with a strict increase if i and j are direct neighbor) which the planner values. The cost of operating i is still wf i L so the net benefit of operating i weakly increases.
Proof. Take a set of firms J and suppose that there exists i, j ∈ J such that Ω ij = 0. Operating these firms provides a certain benefit to the planner, and this benefit is increasing in the firms' productivities {q k } k∈J . Suppose instead that Ω ij > 0. By equation (7), this additional potential connection weakly increases each productivity q j for j ∈ J , with a strict increase for q j if i and j produce a positive amount, i.e. q i > 0 and q j > 0. The cost to the planner of operating the firms in J is unchanged by the inclusion of the additional potential connection Ω ij . As a result, the incentives of the planner to operate the firms in J are larger with Ω ij > 0.
D.6 Aggregate fluctuations
Proof. Using Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, we can rewrite P as maximizing (6) over the set θ ∈ {0, 1} n where the vector q solves, for each j ∈ N , (5). Let's denote this problem as P A , where A refers to the aggregate productivity level. We will show that the optimal vector θ A that solves P A also solves an alternative problem PÃ in which aggregate productivity isÃ instead. Define p j = Ã A 1 1−α q j , then the objective function of PÃ can be written as Ã /A 1 1−α j∈N β j p σ−1 j 1 σ−1 1 − f j j∈N θ j L and its recursive equation (5) can be written as p j = z j θ j A i∈N Ω ij (p i ) ε j −1 α ε j −1 . Since the constant Ã /A 1 1−α does not affect the maximization, PÃ is the same problem as P A , and, at the optimum, pÃ = q A and θÃ = θ A . The production network is therefore invariant to changes in aggregate productivity A.
Online Appendix (not for publication)
This online appendix contains the algorithms referenced in the paper as well as additional quantitative exercises.
E Algorithms
This appendix describes the various algorithms used in the paper.
E.1 Construction of the matrix Ω for the numerical tests.
This algorithm constructs the matrices Ω used in the numerical tests of Section 3.1 in the main text and of Sections B.1 and B.3 in the Appendix. Consider an economy with n firms, each with m incoming potential connections on average. Set p = m/n and Ω ij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N 2 .
1. For each i, j ∈ N 2 draw Ω ij ∼ iid Bernoulli(p).
2. For each i, j ∈ N 2 such that Ω ij = 1, draw Ω ij ∼ iid U [0, 1].
E.2 Exhaustive search
This algorithm performs an exhaustive search of the 2 n vectors θ ∈ {0, 1} n . It is used in Section 3.1 in the main text as well as in Sections B.1, B.3 and B .4 in the Appendix.
for each k ∈ N and update to ∆µ p+1 = ψ∆µ + (1 − ψ) ∆µ p where 0 < ψ ≤ 1 is some parameter to control the speed of convergence.
3. Repeat step 2 above until convergence on ∆µ.
In practice, it is useful to slow down the updating rule by setting ψ = 0.9.
Notice that this algorithm imposes that θ ∈ {0, 1} n at every iteration. When the solution to R is not in {0, 1} n , the algorithm does not converge and the status θ of some firms keeps alternating between 0 and 1. In practice, I stop the algorithm when the distance between ∆µ p+1 k and ∆µ p k starts to increase, which usually indicates that there will be no convergence. I then look at the set of firms for which θ keeps alternating (different sign for ∆µ p+1 k and ∆µ p k ), and then pick the best θ ∈ {0, 1} to maximize the planner's objective function.
E.5 Construction of the matrix Ω in the calibrated economy
The matrix Ω is constructed by assuming that the number of potential incoming and outgoing connections (x in , x out ), for any given firm, is drawn from a bivariate power law of the first kind K for which the joint density over (x in , x out ) is g (x in , x out ) = ξ (ξ − 1) (x in + x out − 1) −(ξ+1) . The full algorithm to construct the matrix is as follows:
1. Begin with Ω ij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N 2 .
2. For each firm j ∈ N , draw from K a pair x j in , x j out for the number of incoming and outgoing connections for j. Redraw until j x j in = j x j out so that the total number of incoming connections is equal to the total number of outgoing connections in the economy.
3. For each j ∈ N , create x j in incoming stubs and x j out outgoing stubs.
4. Randomly match each incoming stub to an outgoing stub. An incoming stub has the same probability of being matched with any outgoing stub. Set Ω ij = 1 where i is the firm associated with the outgoing stub and j is the firm associated with the incoming stub.
F Simulations with a large number of firms and aggregate shocks
To investigate how the model behaves under a more realistic parametrization, I simulate the calibrated economy with n = 20, 000 firms and with aggregate shocks to total factor productivity A. The number of firms was chosen to roughly match the number of operating firms in the Factset data. I assume that log (A t ) follows an AR(1) process with an autocorrelation of 0.9 and and a standard deviation parameter set to match empirical estimates about the impact of aggregate shocks on volatility. 44 Table 14 shows the correlations between aggregate output and the shape of the network. 44 Atalay (2017) generalizes an empirical strategy introduced by Foerster et al. (2011) to evaluate the impact of aggregate shocks on aggregate fluctuations. He finds that they account for 17% of volatility. I parametrize the stochastic process followed by log (At) to match that estimate.
We see that the numbers are broadly similar to those of the benchmark calibration. I also compute the difference in output volatility between the flexible and fixed networks in this setting. I find that the flexible network economy is about 13% less volatile. Finally, aggregate output is also 10% larger under the flexible network, roughly the same number as in the benchmark economy. Notes: All time series are in logs. The parameters of the economy are as in the benchmark calibration except as mentioned in the text. Since these simulations are computationaly intensive, I simulate four economies instead of twenty in the benchmark exercises.
G Changing Ω
To see how the matrix Ω affects the efficient allocation, I simulate the model under different parametrization for Ω. I still assume that Ω is drawn from a bivariate power law of the first kind but I vary its exponent to ξ = 1.7 and ξ = 1.9. The results are presented in Table 15 . We see from the table that changing ξ has a direct impact on the degree distributions and the global clustering coefficient in the efficient network. Under ξ = 1.7, the distribution of the number of potential connections features thicker tails such that Ω offers a lot of options for the planner to create highly-connected firms and dense clusters of producers. The planner takes advantage of these possibilities to increase welfare: the mean of aggregate output is 14.7 under ξ = 1.7, but only 13.4 under ξ = 1.9. Notes: The parameters are the same as in the benchmark calibration except for the distribution from which Ω is drawn (see text).
